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In most appraisals of democracy today the media figures
prominently (Dahlgren, 2000). As the main channel of
communication between elected representatives and citizens, the
performance of the media is much debated and often maligned.
Given this position, a large amount of academic research has
grappled with the impact of the media on ‘civic engagement’ or
elements of citizenship. Unsurprisingly, given the complexities
of untangling media and audience interplay, and the size of the
issues at stake, consensus has been difficult to achieve.
The task of assessing media performance in terms of facilitating
democratic engagement and civic values might be easier in a
static environment, but given the dramatic structural, cultural
and technological changes to the media environment in the past 30
years, this job becomes even more daunting. It is therefore my
intention to pull-together and extend some current strands of
thinking on the relationship between the media and the
electorate.
More specifically, this involves considering what conception of
voters the news media provide, both implicit and explicit. How
are people encouraged to view politics? Does it reflect and
encourage an electorate that is a spectator rather than a
political participant? Do journalists, editors and producers see
their job as serving the informational needs of citizens, or as
competing for the attention of entertainment-hungry consumers? I
will argue that due to changes in the media environment it is
increasingly becoming the latter. This has had mixed consequences
for media output and the images of public affairs offered to
audiences. If taken as a whole, I argue the media currently
serves the differing informational needs of its audiences well,
and offers many outlets for active citizen expression. But at the
same time, there is reason to believe that some trends in
journalism can be encouraging audience passivity and even
disconnecting audiences from the power to participate actively in
political life.
My focus will be largely on the news media (in the UK, with an
occasional sideways glance elsewhere), but given the increasingly
blurred boundaries between journalism and mediated popular
culture (Brants, 1998; Dahlgren, 2000; Street, 2001; 2004),
consideration will also be given to other media outputs. As
political, social and consumerist discourses become ever more
intertextual (Miles, 1998; Slater, 1997), so the relationship
between civic and consumer culture also overlaps. I will
therefore consider some of the implications of this for
democratic engagement.
News media organisations and their audience: from a community of
citizens to a market of consumers?
Stanyer (2007) claims that 30 or 40 yrs ago the main news
organisations in the US and UK saw their audience first and
foremost as members of a national political community, and their
role was to cater for their informational needs. Newspaper
journalists had a commitment to providing accurate and factual
information, and to serve the public as a whole, rather than
particular interests (Hallin, 2000). This role was facilitated by
their external environment, where newspapers were relatively
sheltered from economic forces due to a stable income from
advertisers, little direct competition for this revenue from
broadcasters, and stable consumption patterns from readers
(Patterson, 2000; Seymour-Ure, 1991; Stanyer, 2007). The same
held for broadcasters, both commercial and public service
broadcasters (PSB), whose ethos was to educate, inform and
entertain (Curran and Seaton, 2003). This conception of the
audience as citizens was enforced through regulators, who tightly
monitored broadcasting output to ensure it met the standards for
an informed and engaged citizenry. According to Stanyer, (2007),
over much of the 20th century, the news media thus embraced their
civic role. Journalism was seen as a public service, and the role
of the news media was to provide a community of citizens with
information on which to make political decisions, and act as a
forum for expression of public opinion (Hallin 1992; Seymour-Ure
1991).
The news media’s citizen-centred outlook arguably faded from the
1980s, as the media environment as a whole underwent rapid
transformation. A number of factors combined to bring about this
change (See McNair, 1999; 2006; Stanyer, 2007; Swanson, 2001;
Tunstall, 2002). Increasingly liberal government media policy
eroded barriers to merger, acquisition and expansion in the
media, and spelled an end to spectrum scarcity. The broadcasting
environment in particular vastly changed since 1990 and the
launch of satellite multi-channel television, meaning terrestrial
channels no longer had a monopoly on broadcast news. Alongside
this was the revolution in new technology, facilitating the
expansion of multi-channel television through digitalisation, and
providing an entirely new platform for media expansion: the
Internet. These developments transformed the information
environment, seeing an explosion in the number of news outlets
and intensification of competition for audiences among them.
Alongside the dramatic changes in the media environment in the
last 30 years have been important cultural changes in their
audience. In particular, the rise of a consumer culture which is
based around consumption and individuality (Bauman, 2001; Firat
and Dholakia, 1998; Wernick, 1991 – for a more detailed account
of this see Scullion chapter in this book). News media audiences
are thus increasingly behaving like consumers in the media
market, so given greater choice, they have responded by
relinquishing their former loyalties, and increasingly obtaining
their news from a wider variety of sources (Dahlgren, 2000;
Norris, 2000; Tunstall, 1996). Traditional news outlets such as
evening television news broadcasts and newspapers have seen a
decline in their audience figures, as more people migrate to
alternative news sources offered by new media technologies.
Although the cause-and-effect relations between the media and
audiences are hard to disentangle in this cycle of information
and economic change, there has been one significant consequence:
given the hyper-competitive market for news provision, almost all
large news media organisations during the 1990s gradually shifted
from a citizen-centred model of news to a market-oriented one
(Franklin, 1997; Stanyer, 2007; Underwood, 1998). News
effectively became a commodity enterprise run by market-oriented
managers, and these authors argue that audiences are now seen as
consumers first and foremost, not citizens (see Langer, 2003;
Bennett, 2000). According to Stanyer (2007), this rethink
stretches across the divide between popular and serious, and
commercial and license-funded media. The consumer-centred
approach has now become taken for granted by most large news
organisations as the way to do news (Attaway-Fink, 2004; Beam,
2001 cited in Stanyer, 2007).
So if we accept this reconceptualisation of the news media’s role
vis-à-vis their audiences, then what are the consequences of this
for media output, and its subsequent ramifications for democracy?
Let us start by considering the potential problems of this
change, before some more optimistic perspectives are explored.
Market-driven news and dumbing down
Due to open markets and an accompanying relaxation of corporate
social responsibility norms, the political economy perspective
sees the news media as increasingly promoting business decisions
above public service and public interest (Bennett, 2000). News
organisations now commonly adopt the consumer model, where the
demands of consumers are catered for, as well as often created.
The introduction of market research, aiming to understand the
preferences of audiences, is now commonly used as a method of
increasing profits (Attaway-Fink, 2004; Stanyer, 2007). Prominent
themes to emerge from early newspaper audience research were:
• Audiences as a whole had a limited appetite for political affairs.
• The most popular items tended not to be ones most associated
with traditional journalism, such as the comic strip and
sport. Human interest stories were very popular.
• Upmarket readers liked light news and human interest stories
as seen in downmarket papers; but this does not work the
other way round – so tabloid readers were not interested in
financial or foreign news.
• Readers responded to price and other marketing inducements.
Promotions and freebies work (See Tunstall, 1996, pp. 217-
218).
With market research pointing in the direction of a smaller
proportion of hard news, many would argue that financial
imperatives meant news organisations were quick to follow. The
result according to some critics is that firstly ‘hard news’ has
been marginalised, and secondly, the direction of news media has
been transformed strikingly in the direction of more dramatized,
entertainment-oriented, and personality-centred images of society
and politics (Barnett, 2002; Bourdieu, 1998; Brants and Neijens,
1998; Franklin, 2004; Pfetsch, 1996). In the British context, Bob
Franklin (1997) sees these developments as representing a
downward trend in political coverage. He argues that: “news media
have increasingly become part of the entertainment industry
instead of providing a forum for informed debate of key issues of
public concern” (Franklin, 1997, p. 4). The result is that:
Journalism’s editorial priorities have changed. Entertainment has
superseded the provision of information; human interest has supplanted
the public interest; measured judgement has succumbed to sensationalism;
the trivial has triumphed over the weighty; the intimate relationships
of celebrities, from soap operas, the world of sport or the royal family
are judged more “newsworthy” than the reporting of significant issues
and events of international consequence. Traditional values have been
replaced by new values; “infotainment” is rampant (Franklin, 1997, p.
4).
The evidence for Franklin’s claims in the UK however is
ambiguous. This is not helped by the scarcity of systematic or
comparative research, as well as the problems of classifying what
constitutes ‘infotainment’ or ‘dumbing down’. There is evidence
that tabloid newspapers, driven by market research, have largely
abandoned coverage of subjects that do not attract readers
(Rooney, 2000). This has inevitably led to more celebrity gossip,
crime stories and sports coverage, but less foreign news and
coverage of government (Carper, 1997; Curran and Seaton, 1997;
McLachlan & Golding, 2000; Sparks, 2000). Broadsheet coverage of
Parliament has declined over time (Franklin, 1997; McKie, 1999;
McLachlan & Golding, 2000; Negrine, 1999; Straw, 1993), though
whether this is cause for alarm is open to debate. There is
little systematic evidence as to whether broadsheets have
replaced ‘hard news’ with softer stories, though many have still
argued that they are increasingly trying to attract audience
share by injecting entertainment values into news stories
(Brants, 1998; Brants and Neijens, 1998; McLachlan & Golding,
2000; Pfetsch, 1996; Bromley, 2001).
Like newspapers, all broadcasters are under increasing pressure to rationalise
their budgets, service more outlets and increase audiences at the very time
that competition is growing not just from more channels but from on-line news
sources (Barnett et al., 2000). ‘Accessibility’ and ‘consumer-friendliness’
have arguably become more important for broadcasters, given their shrinking
audiences. Commercial channels like ITV and Channel 5 have adopted this most
wholeheartedly, but the BBC, through its organisational need for
popularity, has not been immune either, as reflected in the
findings of recent internal reviews in news provision (see BBC,
2002). For some, terms like ‘consumer-friendliness’ mean widening
the appeal of politics, but for others this argument can quickly
become one for displacing serious political coverage with trivial
and ‘catchy’ stories. Looking at current affairs broadcasting
outside of news programmes, the consumer-centred model might also
explain why hard-hitting documentaries have been decomissioned or
shifted to the periphery of schedules, and less challenging but
profit-maximising ones like ‘Tonight with Trevor Macdonald’ or a
myriad of docu-soaps are offered instead (see Tumber, 2001).
It is the consumer-centred and market-driven nature of the modern
news media that has encouraged downward trends in news provision
according to these critics. If substantial and weighty news is
superseded by the trivial, then the ability of audiences to
engage with political life is compromised. For Bennett (1992),
the result of a media concerned with the spectacle of news is
that it can disconnect its audience from the power to participate
actively in political life. They are “passive receivers, no
longer active participants, in the dialogue of democracy”
(Franklin, 2004, p. 14).
Politics as a specialist interest: media coverage of elections
Trends in media coverage of elections can also be explained by
the re-conceptualisation of the audience from citizen to
consumer. This can be seen in the amount of space devoted to
election news in many media outlets as well as its direction.
Given their apparent limited appetite for political information,
news organisations are under increasing pressure to ration the
amount of news items that may be worthy but do not attract the
biggest audiences. So as not to risk haemorrhaging audiences,
mainstream news outlets have thus reduced their coverage of
elections, while simultaneously placing more material in niche
supplements or online (Stanyer, 2007). Analysis of television
coverage of general elections for example has shown that the
amount of news devoted to the campaign on some terrestrial
channels has fallen markedly since studies began in 1992, with
BBC1 and BBC2 coverage almost halving (Deacon et al., 2005). The
decline of election coverage in the British popular press is even
more alarming, with Deacon et al. noting an increasing
disengagement with the formal political process. Out of a
possible 21 days of campaigning, the Sun, Mirror and the
Star carried campaign news on their front pages in 2005 on seven,
five and three days respectively (Stanyer, 2007). Broadsheets
have maintained their coverage of general elections, but their
substantial coverage can often be found in specialist supplements
rather than the main sections. News coverage of second-order
elections such as local or European elections is very low across
the British media, and has virtually disappeared in the popular
press (de Vreese et al., 2006; Peter et al., 2004).
Alongside the decline of elections and political affairs in main
news outlets has been a growth in material on the web and 24-hour
news channels. Such platforms provide an endless supply of
information and comment for the engaged citizen, but there is
little evidence so far that it has reached beyond the interested
minority (see Schifferes et al., 2007). Shared experiences of
political affairs via the mass media are therefore arguably in
retreat: “Detailed election coverage, once a feature of
mainstream news, is now treated as a specialist interest, there
if the consumer wants it” (Stanyer, 2007, p. 117). The worrying
outcome of such trends is that they may have damaging
implications for political knowledge, interest and participation,
as it becomes much easier for audiences to avoid substantive
political coverage than ever before.
The direction of election coverage is another concern for many.
The political economy of the media and the need to attract
audiences can explain the shift in media agendas from one focused
on substantive issues, to one dominated by political scandal
(Lull & Hinerman, 1997), campaigning strategies (e.g. Entman,
1989;  Jamieson, 1992; Lichter & Noyes, 1996) and sports
metaphors (Patterson, 1993). As the newsworthiness of election
items comes under increasing scrutiny, the strategy news frame or
‘game schema’ arguably fits many news values that issue-based
coverage does not. For example, previous research on news values
has found that ‘human interest’, ‘conflict’, ‘shared narratives’
(e.g. Good Vs Evil) and ‘controversy’ are central news values
(McManus, 1994; Price et al., 1997; Stephens, 1980). As stories
that focus on political strategy and the ‘game’ of politics fit
many of the above criteria, so they are more likely to be given
space on the news agenda. The rising prominence of these types of
reporting have been well documented in the US context, but less
so in the UK. Still, election content analysis data tells us that
‘electoral process’[1] news represented 44 per cent of all
campaign news in 2005 (Deacon et al., 2005), up from 32 per cent
in 1997 (Wring, 1997). Comparable data from the 1983 general
election shows the figure at 30 per cent for television news and
26 per cent for five national newspapers[2] (Semetko et al.,
1991).
For some, politics-as-game journalism is a reasonable response to
increasing attempts by politicians to manipulate the electorate
through political PR. It has ‘demystified’ the dark arts of spin
doctoring, lending more transparency and balance to the political
process (McNair, 2006). They are right, however, when this type
of journalism regularly constitutes around half of all election
coverage it is probably too much, as in-depth and prolonged
attention to substantive issues is compromised. There is also
evidence that consistent exposure to strategy-focused news has
damaging effects on audiences, undermining their ability to
engage with the political issues that they see in the media. This
can have two related consequences: the first is that the
likelihood of the voter learning from the media is stifled.
Consequently, the ability to understand policy issues, generate
opinions, and hold politicians to account is thus lost. This can
then result in or aggravate a second problem: disenchantment and
cynicism towards the political process. As Fallows explains: “By
choosing to present public life as a contest between scheming
political leaders, all of whom the public should view with
suspicion, the mass media helps bring about that very result”
(1996, p. 7). There is some evidence to confirm this from
empirical research carried out in the USA which has measured the
effects of strategic coverage, usually through experimental
methods (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Rhee, 1997; Valentino,
Beckmann & Buhr, 2001). It should be noted that there is no
evidence for such a demobilising effect in the UK other than a
small-scale experimental study, where those exposed to the
strategy frame showed more political cynicism than their ‘issue’
frame (control) counterparts. The effects, however, were only for
the less politically sophisticated and engaged, and caution
should be exercised over any long-term impact (Jackson, 2005).
It is therefore precisely because of their treatment of the
audience as consumer and not citizen that processes described
above are able to take place. The supposed squeezing out of ‘hard
news’ in mainstream news outlets at the expense of ‘soft news’,
and the growing trend of emphasising political strategies and
conflicts over substantive issues is merely profit-seeking news
organisations following what they perceive their audiences to
prefer. Though interestingly, Bennett (2001) has argued in the
USA that market-driven news does not necessarily have to reflect
public demand. For him, low budget people-centred, dramatised
news is not so much the result of popular demand as it is the
most profitable product to produce. Other information formats at
the high-brow end of the scale can turn out to be popular, and
they are not losing money, but they are simply not making as much
money as low-budget news. In this view, “bad news is not the
choice of the people; it is the choice offered to the people”
(Bennett, 2000, p. 4), and it is the responsibility of
governments to step in to protect news provision from these
market pressures. Either way, it is the consequences of
commercial imperatives and market-driven journalism that are
potentially impoverishing the information landscape.
Constructing a passive audience
What exactly might these trends mean for how people imagine
citizenship, public participation, governments, leaders and
democratic accountability? There is reason to believe that the
way politics is covered, particularly at elections, relegates
audiences to passive spectators and not actors (Lewis et al.,
2005). Process news for example, and the ‘game schema’ in
particular, through its overwhelming focus on the activities and
motivations of elites, constructs politics as a game played by
politicians, not ordinary citizens. At precisely the time when
citizens should be being mobilised to turnout and vote, studies
have shown that they are encouraged to see their role as passive
observers of the actions of political elites (Brookes et al.,
2004). When the public are referred to during election coverage
it is in a limited capacity. There is very little substantive
expression of their opinion, with voter apathy itself a prominent
news theme (Brookes et al., 2004; Thomas et al., 2004).
Corporate media: corporate journalism?
So far I have looked at how structural, regulatory and
technological changes in the media have had profound implications
for how audiences are conceptualised by news organisations. This
has created a greater diversity of news offerings and for some
critics, has led to standards in journalism to fall. Another
critique of the contemporary news media relates to its corporate
and commercial bias, which emanate from the organisation and
structure of the media itself. As profit-seeking entities,
commercial media organisations are reliant on advertising as the
primary source of their income. As political economists have
noted, this dependence can come at a cost (e.g. Baker, 1994;
Hackett, 2001; Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Baker (1994, p. 69-70),
for example, identifies four consequences of this dependency:
• Advertising discourages critical accounts of advertisers’
products, including their inadequacies or dangers. Exposés
of wrongdoing by advertisers are also unlikely.
• It encourages political blandness over partisan positions
on controversial issues because advertisers want the
maximum possible audience and to avoid offending potential
consumers.
• In order to promote a buying mood, advertisers want
lighter material rather than critical thought or attention
to difficult issues that might undermine the ethos of
consumerism.
• Because advertisers want consumers who are most able and
willing to buy their products, the news media tend to
adopt perspectives and serve the informational and
entertainment needs of the relatively affluent.
As a newspaper funded entirely by advertising revenue, the Metro
perhaps best illustrates this argument. It is aimed primarily at
well-educated people in the 15-35 age group, who are most
attractive to advertisers (Wilcox, 2005). Its offering is largely
apolitical, with minimal comment or political positioning that
would be likely to challenge or offend any reader. Costs are low,
as news copy is ‘cut and pasted’ from international news agencies
with little or no editorial comment. Critics have argued that it
has no independence that a cover price grants, as the ultimate
sanction governing the content was displaced from the consumer to
the advertiser (see Wilcox, 2005). With the recent launch of
similar ‘copycat’ offerings, such as thelondonpaper and
londonlite in the UK, there is even more chance that free
newspapers will take readers away from paid-for titles within big
cities.
Another sign of the corporate influence on news provision can be
seen in the newsroom itself. As news organisations increasingly
belong to transnational conglomerates, holding interests in a
range of different media and industries, conflicts of interest
can bedevil news judgement, as journalists may feel pressured to
promote or suppress certain viewpoints about the empire (Hackett,
2005). Newsroom culture in large commercial organisations moves
away from an ethos of public service, as journalists are asked to
become corporate team players.
Once again, the reconceptualisation of the news audience from
citizen to consumer has allowed and even encouraged this
situation to develop. The consequences for democracy of a
commercially dominated news media system are potentially harmful
according to McChesney, as they carry a huge implicit political
bias: “Consumerism, class inequality and individualism tend to be
taken as natural and even benevolent, whereas political activity,
civic values and anti-market activities are marginalised”
(McChesney, 2003, p. 36). The news media are thus central in the
definition of culture in terms of consumerism and not
citizenship. For him, the combination of neoliberal media
policies and corporate media culture tends to promote a deep and
profound de-politicisation of society, evidence of which can be
seen across the western world, and the USA in particular.
The findings of a recent content analysis of British and American
news would seem to be consistent with McChesney’s claims. After a
comprehensive study of public opinion in the news media, Lewis et
al. (2005) concluded that the public are represented more as
consumers than citizens. They are largely portrayed as passive
and powerless observers of the world, who have fears, impressions
and desires, but have little to say about the big issues on the
political agenda. They are also reactive to the news agenda,
which is set by politicians and other elites. “Their power is
limited to the ability to choose one product rather than another
– or else, more subversively perhaps, to not buy anything at all”
(ibid. p. 138). For Brookes et al. (2004, p. 78), this discursive
construction of the apathetic electorate “works ideologically to
legitimize a situation in which media and political elites are
the key players, while citizens are incapable of making
meaningful contributions to the debate”. In a very real sense,
therefore, the media are helping establish the political
alienation they claim to deplore.
To summarise, there is a large body of opinion, supported by some
convincing evidence, that the consumer model adopted by
contemporary news organisations encourages the proliferation of
certain types of journalism. According to this pessimistic
perspective, this can in turn fail to serve the informational
needs many citizens and in some cases demobilise parts of the
electorate. Secondly, the consumer model, itself a result of
market deregulation and changes in the news environment, has
(perhaps predictably) encouraged an implicit bias towards
consumerist ideology over citizenship in the news media. Again,
this can have damaging implications for democracy, as selfish
consumption and individuality can take precedence over political
participation and civic values.
Diversification not dumbing down: the ‘postmodern’ perspective
I have so far given a largely pessimistic and one-sided account
of the impact of market forces on news output, and what this
means for audiences. An optimistic or sometimes labelled
‘postmodernist’ perspective (McNair, 1999) offers some entirely
different interpretations of such changes. Proponents of this
view do not dispute the marketisation of the news media in recent
years, nor would they disagree with the reconceptualisation of
the news audience from citizen to consumer, but they strongly
disagree with the consequences, pointing out the many benefits
the changes in news provision have brought for citizens. They
firstly dispute the concept of wholesale dumbing down of news.
Instead, what has taken place is a diversification of news
provision, based around the concept of market segmentation (see
McNair, 1999; Norris, 2000). They accept that many mainstream
news outlets have introduced more ‘low-brow’ elements like an
emphasis on visuals and human interest stories, but this hides
the diversity of the overall news market. Concluding their large-
scale content analysis of television news, Barnett et al. (2000)
note that there has undoubtedly been a shift in most bulletins
towards a more tabloid domestic agenda, yet in comparison with
other Western countries, the UK’s broadcasting environment has
arguably resisted many downward trends. What has occurred though
is that news bulletins are more tailored to a specific audience
and more consciously ‘branded’. Distinct editorial policies have
emerged to aim for the highbrow, middlebrow or apathetic twenty-
somethings. This desire of media outlets to target specific niche
audiences has helped expand the styles and formats of political
information, and can arguably provide an incentive to invest in
quality journalism, as there is a clear demand for it at one end
of the market.
Part of this marketplace of information offerings includes of
course the internet, where there are a number of sites that
undoubtedly address their audience as citizen. Importantly for
us, in contrast to how many mainstream news outlets construct
their audiences, online forums, blogs and networks demand active
audience participation. Citizens are therefore empowered and
given a voice in the public sphere, including some of the
resource poor and those with alternative and oppositional
viewpoints (Coleman, 2002). Of course, it is important not to
exaggerate the overall impact of the internet on democracy so
far. The use of the internet for anything to do with politics or
the public sphere comes very low on the list of purposes to which
it is put to (Hill & Hughes, 1998). What is more, online citizen
involvement so far has been largely dominated by the educated and
wealthy (Chadwick, 2006). Still, for the motivated minority, it
has provided a wealth of opportunity for information exchange and
political expression.
Another strand of the ‘postmodernist’ perspective acknowledges
some of the trends outlined earlier but dismisses them as
harmless or even beneficial to democracy. What might be loosely
termed ‘popularisation’ could possibly mobilise engagement in
audiences, even in non-traditional ways (Dahlgren, 2000). For
example, the collapsing of boundaries between the genres of news,
entertainment and drama are redefining what we might call
‘political’, and may result in offerings that are more accessible
to broader audiences (see Dahlgren & Sparks, 1992; Street, 2001).
These offerings can thus speak to their audience in new and
different ways. Daytime chat shows or radio phone-ins,
undoubtedly frivolous and trivial at times, nevertheless allow
topics from the private sphere into the public often framed as
political. This can legitimise the views and experiences of
ordinary people, even when faced by ‘expert’ or ‘elite’ opponents
(see Livingstone & Lunt, 1994). Talk shows and radio phone-ins
are offered at the high-brow and low-brow ends of the market,
with programmes such as ‘Question Time’ arguably representing the
former and youth-oriented talk shows on T4 or MTV the latter
(though these are admittedly only shown sporadically). In these
programmes, citizens can scrutinise political elites on issues of
their choice. Although the audience and elite guests do not enter
on an equal footing, there is still an element of empowerment
given to citizens through the exchanges they offer. Turning back
to the representation of audiences as found by Lewis et al.
(2005), these types of programmes arguably represent a very
different construction of the electorate. Far from being passive,
powerless and apathetic, talk shows display an audience that is
active, passionate and engaged.
Politics as a ‘lifestyle’ choice
No matter which side of the debate over news media performance
you stand on, there can be little doubt that the information
environment we are observing is in a state of uncertainty and
flux. Traditional ways of receiving the news are under threat as
a result of media fragmentation and technological change, meaning
shared experiences of news events are in decline. Against a
backdrop of increased competition for elusive audiences, media
organisations are clearly tailoring their news offerings to the
tastes of certain segments of the audience, which they now
primarily see as a consumer. Many in the ‘optimistic’ camp are
comfortable with this, as the informational needs of most people
are catered for. There is also undoubtedly more news and
journalism circulating in the public sphere than ever before,
which should be considered a good thing (McNair, 1999). However,
segmentation and fragmentation do bring potential dangers as
well. In a commercially dominated system which is driven by the
demands of advertisers, audiences can be segmented by
technological access and spending power, not cultural or civic
needs (McChesney, 2000). The resulting risk is that some citizens
who are less desirable to advertisers are disregarded by the
market. As Gandy (2000) explains, the targeting of ever more
specialised and smaller groups serves to undercut a common public
culture. In this sense, segmentation is implicitly anti-civic and
anti-collectivist. As discussed earlier, another emerging feature
of political coverage amongst mainstream news organisations has
been to steadily cut back on weighty and substantive journalism
in their main sections. Instead, it is increasingly offered as a
choice for the interested consumer, such as through a newspaper
supplement or online. For the interested citizen, there has never
been more information available but at the same time it has never
been easier to avoid political fare either.
These developments also matter for how the audience is
constructed by the media. The ‘postmodernist’ account would point
out the vibrant array of TV, radio and online offerings where
citizens are active and empowered. They are right. However, these
types of programmes are a choice, which only a minority of
citizens choose to take up. There is evidence that mass audience
platforms such as the evening news bulletins and national
newspapers, present public affairs as a world dominated and
shaped by elites, where the audience are spectators not actors.
This is a worry, because by representing a passive and apathetic
audience of consumers not citizens, they may help bring about
that very result (Lewis et al., 2005).
If taken as a whole, the media seems to be reflecting, as well as
constructing, what has been termed ‘lifestyle politics’ (see
Bennett, 1998; Dahlgren, 2000). Although the term pulls together
many diversified tendencies, an important one may be the
renegotiation of political engagement and participation from a
duty to a lifestyle choice. We therefore arrive at a point
whereby one’s ease with these developments depends on where you
see the role of the media in democracy, as well as how you
conceptualise democratic engagement itself. From the traditional
(and perhaps idealistic) perspective of citizenship and
democracy, the rise of lifestyle politics represents a worrying
move away from collective identity and participation, and towards
opportunism and frivolity. For them, a liberal democracy needs an
informed citizenry who can make rational decisions based on
widely available information. As this information is often
complex, untidy, or even held back, so it is the journalist’s job
to overcome obstacles and shed light; to act as nation’s watchdog
and present information with impartiality and objectivity (see
Hackett, 2005).
Those of a more optimistic temperament are less concerned with the
move towards politics as a lifestyle choice. Joseph Schumpeter’s
(1976) view of democracy for example, suggests that given the
complexity of modern issues and the vulnerability of masses to
irrational and emotional appeals, ongoing political participation
is neither necessary nor even desirable. For many, falling
electoral turnout is still of some concern, but it is compensated
(and partly explain ed) by the rise of less formal expressions of
political engagement, which demonstrate that many people still
care deeply about issues that matter to them. From this
perspective then, individualised lifestyle politics is not
incompatible with a healthy democracy. Looking at the media’s
role, in order to participate in political affairs, Norris (2000)
argues the media does not need to fill voters with broad civics
knowledge, but to provide enough context-specific information to
enable them to assess the consequences of their political
choices.
Conclusion
These divergent philosophies cannot be easily reconciled, but
they provide the intellectual backdrop to understanding some of
challenges media change has brought about. Bennett and Entman
(2001) identify what they describe as three ‘broad tensions’
facing mature democracies, which this chapter has explored. The
first is between diversity and commonality: media fragmentation
and segmentation have expanded the genres of what can be termed
‘political’, but shared experiences of politics are under threat.
I have already suggested some of the dangers of increased
segmentation along commercial lines, but changes in media
technology (e.g. mobile text alerts, RSS feeds) mean that a more
personalised experience of news and current affairs seems
inevitable in the future. The challenge for media practitioners
is to maintain a sense of shared identity in their offerings, so
as to foster a culture that still values civic life.
The second tension concerns the information necessary for
citizens to participate effectively in democratic life, versus
the entertainment-driven focus of an increasingly commercial-
oriented media. At the crux of this tension lies the question
(more relevant than ever) of what news is: is it what the public
is interested in, or what is in the public interest? The
traditional view, elucidated by Reuvan Frank, former president of
NBC News, is emphatically the former: “This business of giving
people what they want is a dope pusher’s argument. News is
something people don’t know they’re interested in until they hear
about it. The job of a journalist is to take what ‘s important
and make it interesting” (cited in Hickey, 1998, p. 34). This
view is challenged by the new forms of ‘political’ offerings,
which are infused with infotainment values. For them, the terms
(public interest Vs what the public are interested in) might not
have to be mutually exclusive. News organisations like the BBC
would no doubt argue they are able to offer mixture of both, even
within a single news bulletin. Underwriting this second tension
are the market forces of a largely commercial media landscape.
Compared to the US system, Britain is still relatively protected
from the worst excesses of the market, but this is not inevitable
or permanent. The 2003 Communications Act, for example,
represented a move towards further commercial influence in the
media. There is now a real danger of an erosion of the
traditional regulations that ensured commercial broadcasters
invested in a range of programmes beyond simply the most
profitable (see Barnett, 2002). No matter which side of the
dumbing down debate one sits on, both would agree that a range of
news and current affairs outputs is essential, and should be
vigorously defended.
The final tension Bennett and Entman identify is between the need
of the media to treat people as citizens on the one hand and as
consumer publics on the other. If we consider the media
environment as a whole, there can be little doubt that we are
overwhelmingly addressed as consumers rather than citizens. The
circulation of goods, the material and symbolic meanings of
commodities, and the dominant position of advertising in its many
forms make civic culture look diminutive in comparison (Dahlgren,
2000). Nevertheless, I have argued there are still many widely
available media platforms where audiences are encouraged to
consider themselves as active citizens, and these are aided by
the opportunities that technological change offer. But these are
offered as a choice, and so responsibility for the outcomes of
these choices increasingly rests with the individual. This is not
without its problems though, because representations of the
public in mainstream news outlets like the press and evening news
appear to do little to encourage an active audience of citizens
(Lewis et al., 2005). This is a concern because these are still
by far the most popular news platforms available, and are
arguably the most important mediums for shaping how audiences
imagine public life and their role in it. If most people are fed
a diet of news that encourages them to view their role in
political affairs as apolitical spectators, then it may be that
it discourages them seek-out the mediums where active political
engagement is celebrated and encouraged.
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[1] ‘Election process’ includes discussion of campaigning strategies, opinion
polls/ horse race, passing references to the chosen daily topic agendas of
political parties, political tensions and infighting within parties, party
spin/ PR/ news management, and other themes (Deacon et al., 2005).
[2] Made up of ‘opinion polls’, and ‘party strategies and prospects’.
Newspapers analysed were The Sun, The Mirror, The Daily Mail, The Times and
The Guardian.
